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I. INTRODUCTION
“There are now no lines.” 1

When the Supreme Court held in 1988 that the Independent
Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act did not violate the
separation of powers, Antonin Scalia could not contain his
frustration. The Court had just told the Nation that the Constitution
permitted Congress to enact a law that allowed federal judges to appoint
a prosecutor—who would have the full weight of the Justice Department
behind her, and who could be removed only for good cause—because
she is an inferior officer, and Congress’s restriction on her removal was
not too intrusive with respect to the President’s constitutional functions. 2
To Scalia, this case—the wolf that came as a wolf 3—proved why the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.
I appreciate the invitation to participate in this symposium. Some of the ideas expressed here are
derived from my presentation at the Michigan Journal of Law Reform’s symposium on the future of
the death penalty, held in February 2016 (only days before Justice Scalia’s death). I am grateful for
the feedback I received during that event. I am also grateful to Trish McDermott for her excellent
editorial and research assistance.
1. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rule of law demands a decent respect for the formal arrangements of
American government. Those forms create space within which each
department of government can function effectively in carrying out its
powers. 4 They also create boundaries that prevent encroachments by
ambitious actors in the other branches, vying for more power,
concentrating authority. 5 The rule of law in a constitutional republic,
then, requires adherence to formalities, and those formalities require the
drawing of lines. Scalia therefore lamented: there were now no lines.
When the Court upheld the federal law in Morrison v. Olson, it
undermined the virtue of lines, making the ones between the three
branches fuzzy, at best. Scalia’s lone dissenting voice reminded us that,
in constitutional government, even fuzzy lines are no lines at all.
The formality of lines was critical to the world in which Justice
Scalia lived and worked—to his perspectives on the law and the
Constitution, the role of judges, and (one might credibly argue) life. 6 In
political life, lines help to establish authority, telling actors what they are
empowered to do, and also to restrain. Constitutional government—like
life—requires a proper understanding, and exercise, of restraint. “Long
live formalism!,” Scalia once declared.7 “It is what makes a government
a government of laws and not of men.” 8
Unsurprisingly, much of Scalia’s work in the areas of criminal law
and procedure was devoted to understanding and preserving appropriate
lines. Scalia not only safeguarded the Government’s power to define
crimes, but also was prepared to enforce the lines that limited that
power. Sometimes he sided with the Government, sometimes with the
criminal defendant, in ways that confounded conventional labels that are
often given to the Justices. 9 When he interpreted federal criminal
4. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 16 (1991).
5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
6. See Christopher Landau, The Anti-Casual Justice, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 579
(2016). Landau, a former Scalia clerk, recounts the annual Scalia-law-clerk reunion: “a black-tie
dinner in the West Conference Room of the Supreme Court on the first Saturday night in May.
Champagne and sirloin. Spouses or announced fiancé(e)s only.” Id. Landau further observed that
“[t]he reunion fit the man. In a society in which it was fashionable to be casual, Antonin Scalia was
not . . . I cannot imagine the Scalia reunion in the format of a backyard barbecue with the Justice
flipping burgers.” Id. Though Scalia was “warm and engaging,” still, “he clearly believed, in
matters both large and small, in formality and ritual.” Id.
7. See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25 (1997) (hereinafter Common Law
Courts).
8. Id.
9. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).
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statutes, he favored his own brand of discerning meaning that
championed precision and an understanding of English usage. 10 He
agreed that there were limits to the scope of Congress’s ability to define
crimes using the commerce power, 11 but also he provided a key vote and
distinguishing rationale for allowing Congress to use the commerce
power, incident to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to combat drug
trafficking. 12 He wrote the definitive opinion on the scope of the Second
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, favoring an individual, rather
than collective, right. 13 But he also confounded the more libertarian
aspects of the opinion by empowering criminal law-making with respect
to firearms control, invoking limits on the possession of guns by felons
and the mentally ill and restrictions on commercial sale, carrying in
sensitive public places, and the possession of dangerous and unusual
weapons. 14
In criminal procedure, he wrote deeply influential opinions on the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, leading the Court to adopt—or at
least grapple with—new (or, in Scalia’s view, old) understandings of the
right to trial by jury 15 and to confront witnesses. 16 He even favored the
constitutional right to self-representation 17 because, as he also articulated
in the Miranda area, 18 the Constitution does not create barriers to a
criminal defendant’s autonomous choice to do something unwise, even
foolish—whether it be confessing (which is, after all, good for the soul)
or eschewing the assistance of a lawyer. He almost single-handedly
revived the trespass doctrine in Fourth Amendment search law, 19
marrying the Fourth Amendment’s text to the common law and
accommodating concerns about modern technology. And it was his
concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States 20 that helped reshape

10. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015) (explaining the meaning of the
forced accompaniment provision of the federal bank robbery statute).
11. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
12. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34-42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
14. Id. at 626-27.
15. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004).
16. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1987).
17. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 186-87 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the dignity
at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—
the dignity of individual choice.”).
18. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013).
20. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the rules for searches of a vehicle incident to arrest that would emerge
later in Arizona v. Gant. 21 At the same time, he advocated sharp limits
on the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 22
His work in criminal law and procedure was both substantial and
influential, and it was not subject to easy, but ultimately confused and
meaningless, labeling as “pro-defendant” or “pro-government,” “toughon-crime” or “soft.” Instead, he was, as he might describe it, pro-text and
pro-rule-of-law (and he saw those two things as closely connected). He
favored enforcing formal constitutional arrangements regardless of the
party they favored in litigation. He championed constitutional
equilibrium, ever vigilant about the circumscribed role of judges in a
constitutional democracy and skeptical of the power of courts to spare
citizens from the burdens and tragedies of political life. In no area of
criminal justice adjudication was that more evident than in the area of
capital punishment. This paper, therefore, examines Scalia’s body of
work in death penalty cases, a body of work defined by his admonition
that judges be modest in reviewing challenges to a sentencing practice
that Scalia found to be both morally and constitutionally acceptable.
New challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment are arising,
and Scalia’s death has created anew the possibility of judicial abolition.
This paper further explores that possibility and argues that the lines
Scalia advocated may well be in jeopardy again.
II. SCALIA ON LINES AND THE DEATH PENALTY
For Scalia, the relationship between constitutional rights and the
legitimate exercise of constitutional power could prove especially
problematic when the right that a court recognizes is either
unenumerated or otherwise has no basis in constitutional text, structure,
history, or tradition. 23 When the judiciary expands the sphere of
constitutional protection for rights, it necessarily restricts the sphere of
permissible political action. And where the judiciary does so, Scalia
believed, illegitimately—such as by adhering to a methodology that
views that Constitution as a “living document” that embodies the values
of each generation, which unelected judges then endeavor to apply
through constitutional adjudication—its restriction of government power
can have pernicious effects on democracy and the capacity for good
21. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
22. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
23. See J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten
Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19, 38-39 (2000).
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citizens to govern themselves safely and effectively. 24 Some things,
good or not, are simply not the business of judges in a constitutional
republic.
So it was, in Scalia’s view, with capital punishment.
A. On Capital Punishment . . . and God
Scalia discussed capital punishment extensively in his extrajudicial
writings, which is noteworthy because it offers the reader a window into
his thinking outside of the context of specific cases and the precise
issues presented therein. Also noteworthy is that his own adherence to
Catholicism did not lead him to the conventional wisdom about the
Church and the death penalty.
He was fond of using capital punishment as an example of his
originalism and of the difficulties, and limits, presented by Living
Constitutionalism. In his initial essay in A Matter of Interpretation,
Scalia noted that three of his colleagues on the Court (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun) had concluded that the death penalty was, in
all circumstances, cruel and unusual and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 25 But Scalia noted that the death penalty “is explicitly
contemplated in the Constitution” 26—in the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause (which forbids the government from depriving a person
of “life” without due process) 27 and its Indictment Clause (which refers
specifically to the indictment of “capital” crimes). 28 This theme appears
prominently in Scalia’s judicial writings on capital punishment 29 and
was one that he developed even earlier in writing about originalism and
constitutional interpretation. 30 He thus chided his Living
Constitutionalist colleagues for their conclusion that something that the
Constitution acknowledges could later “become unconstitutional.” 31 The
24. See Scalia, Common Law Courts, supra note 7, at 41-42.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. For a critical analysis of this argument, see Joseph Blocher, The Death Penalty and
the Fifth Amendment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (2016) (contending that the Fifth
Amendment Argument “itself carries no weight” until Eighth Amendment doctrine changes, and
stating that the constitutionality of capital punishment should be evaluated “without the distraction
of the Fifth Amendment.”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend V.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring); Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989)
(stating “the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment because it is referred to in the
Constitution itself”).
31. Scalia, Common Law Courts, supra note 7, at 46.
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political community may choose to abandon capital punishment, he
noted, but the Constitution does not compel such a policy. Nor, he
thought, does the vacant concept of “evolving standards of decency”
move us closer to such a conclusion. 32 Rather than accurately informing
us of the moral values of the Eighth Amendment, such a concept merely
empowers judges to forever alter criminal sentencing law by imposing
on the Nation their own views of moral progress. 33
His later essay, God’s Justice, And Ours, more fully explored his
views on the subject. 34 Although he did not advocate the imposition of
capital punishment, he concluded in this essay that it was simply not
immoral—an important point, because, in his view, he could not be a
judge if he believed his role in the “machinery of death” resulted in his
approval of a system that was immoral. 35 He said that, for the judge who
believes the death penalty to be immoral, the choice is resignation rather
than to ignore the law and to sabotage capital cases. 36 He openly argued
against Pope John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical, Evangelicum Vitae, which
viewed capital punishment as limited to “cases of absolute necessity: in
other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend
society. 37 Today, however, as a result of steady improvements in the
organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not
practically nonexistent.” 38 As Scalia argued, “[h]ow in the world can
modernity’s ‘steady improvements in the organization of the penal
system’ render the death penalty less condign for a particularly heinous
crime?” 39 He cited Saint Paul and Thomas More as authorities on the
morality of lawfully constituted authority to impose death as a
punishment, alluded to the murders committed by Timothy McVeigh
and the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, and viewed
technological advancements as increasing, rather than diminishing, the
individual’s capacity for evil.40 “If just retribution is a legitimate purpose
(indeed, the principal legitimate purpose) of capital punishment, can one
possibly say with a straight face that nowadays death would ‘rarely if
32. Id. at 40 (referring to the Court’s use of “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958), to guide its view of the
scope of the Eighth Amendment).
33. Id. at 40-41.
34. See Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice, And Ours, FIRST THINGS, (May 2002),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours (hereinafter God’s Justice).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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ever’ be appropriate?” 41
Add to Justice Scalia’s sense of formality and traditionalism the
fact that he regularly attended one of two Latin Masses in the
Washington, D.C. area. 42 It was, therefore, no surprise that he would
sarcastically refer to the “latest, hot-off-the-presses version” of the
catechism that viewed capital punishment so narrowly as to make it
nearly impossible to implement. 43 Nor is it surprising that he would
conclude that his disagreement with the papal encyclical and the “new”
views of the Church did not contradict his obligations as a Catholic. As
he said, he had consulted “canonical experts” who informed him that
neither Evangelicum Vitae nor the latest catechism was binding on
practicing Catholics. 44
The essay is rich and revealing. Scalia was willing to challenge the
latest views on Christian thought about the death penalty when they
would “sweep aside” millennia of Christian teaching. 45 His approach to
constitutional adjudication took similar form. As he said in his essay,
and would repeat on other occasions, 46 “the Constitution that I interpret
and apply is not living but dead—or, as I prefer to put it, enduring. It
means today not what current society (much less the Court) thinks it
ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.” 47 As applied
41. Id. To McVeigh, the September 11 attackers, and many others, one might also add
Johnathan and Reginald Carr, whose case came before the Court in the October 2015 Term and who
were convicted and sentenced to death for horrific crimes that became known as the Wichita
Massacre. See Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
held that the Eighth Amendment did not require the Carr brothers’ jury to be informed that
mitigators do not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 642. This would be Scalia’s
final opinion for the Court.
42. See Kenneth J. Wolfe, Scalia the Music Critic and Pew Policeman, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scalia-the-music-critic-and-pew-policeman-1455840082. Steven
Calabresi also shares a humorous account that highlights Justice Scalia’s traditionalism in matters of
faith. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Unknown Achievements of Justice Scalia, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 576 (2016). Calabresi, a former Scalia clerk, tells of the time immediately following Scalia’s
nomination to the United States Court of Appeals, when he was still a law professor at the
University of Chicago. As he was undergoing the requisite background investigation, FBI agents
contacted Scalia’s priest in Chicago. See id. at 577-78. As Calabresi tells the story, Scalia and his
family “refused to attend mass at the [University of Chicago’s] Catholic chapel, which they
considered to be too liberal and too much in favor of the Vatican II reforms. Instead, they went to
mass in Chicago’s ethnic Italian neighborhood, where the priest was more conservative and
orthodox.” Id. at 578. Once after mass, the priest pulled Scalia aside and expressed worry: “‘Nino, it
is the FBI. They were here yesterday asking all kinds of questions about you. But, Nino, don’t
worry—I told them nothing!’” Id.
43. Scalia, God’s Justice, supra note 34.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Scalia, Common Law Courts, supra note 7, at 45-47.
47. Scalia, God’s Justice, supra note 34.
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specifically to the death penalty, “the constitutionality of the death
penalty is not a difficult, soul-wrenching question. It was clearly
permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted . . . And so it is
clearly permitted today.” 48 If there is to be “evolution” on the
acceptability of the death penalty, then “the instrument[s] of evolution”
are the legislative branches of government at the federal and state levels,
who, at their discretion, may “restrict or abolish the death penalty as they
wish.” 49
Justice Scalia’s position was that although the morality of the death
penalty enabled him to continue to sit on cases involving that
punishment, his personal or political views about the death penalty were
not relevant to exercising judicial power with respect to constitutional
challenges to the death penalty. And his line-drawing in constitutional
adjudication involving the death penalty is consistent with the
understanding of the judge’s formal role in a capital case that he
articulated in these essays.
B. On the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment
Claims regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty—an
issue once thought settled after the Court’s 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia 50—are making a comeback. There is even a movement among
American conservatives to abolish capital punishment, which, though
small today, should be taken seriously by every death penalty
supporter. 51 It is a needle-moving effort. Abolition talk is alive and well.
This is despite the fact, as Scalia and others on the Court repeatedly
reminded us, that the Constitution expressly acknowledges the existence

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
51. I develop this notion further in another forthcoming paper. See J. Richard Broughton,
Hate Crimes, the Death Penalty, and Criminal Justice Reform, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 185 (2017) (Hate Crimes). For some notable commentary on the “conservative case”, see
George F. Will, Capital Punishment’s Slow Death, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/capital-punishments-slow-death/2015/05/20/f3c14d32fe4f-11e4-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html; Leon Neyfakh, The conservative case against the death
penalty, BOSTON GLOBE (May 25, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/05/24/theconservative-case-against-death-penalty/6NsOMqKbpJeIVMlynelCIM/story.html; S.E. Cupp, The
conservative case against the death penalty, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/conservative-case-death-penalty-article-1.1781639;
Mary
Kate Cary, The Conservative Case Against the Death Penalty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (March
30, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/30/the-conservative-case-against-thedeath-penalty.
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of capital punishment. 52 Of course, whether its use violates the Eighth
Amendment may be a separate matter, 53 and its recognition in the Fifth
Amendment is not conclusive of its validity as to all applications; rather,
its recognition in the Fifth Amendment should be a critical factor in
determining whether any application of capital punishment is
constitutionally permissible. Moreover, abolition talk is increasingly
fashionable despite public opinion remaining supportive of capital
punishment, 54 and despite the fact that a clear majority of American
jurisdictions still maintain the death penalty. 55 Claims that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional also persist despite the reality that
abolition would mean concluding that the Constitution forbids applying
the death penalty to any defendant—no matter how heinous, cruel, or
depraved the defendant’s crime, no matter how strong the evidence
against him, and no matter how powerful the aggravators or how weak
the mitigators. 56
Arguments for invalidating the death penalty also rely substantially
upon claims about the risk of executing innocents. 57 Those are, of
course, powerful claims. But they do not explain why every death

52. See Glossip v, Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring); Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
380 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 419 (Powell, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 350-51 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
53. See Blocher, supra note 26, at 3.
54. See J. Richard Broughton, Hate Crimes, the Death Penalty, and Criminal Justice Reform,
37 MITCHELL HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 185 (2017) (Hate Crimes).
55. See States and Capital Punishment, National Conference of State Legislatures (Sept. 6,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx. The information
about Nebraska requires clarification, however: although Nebraska has legislatively abolished the
death penalty, that decision is subject to reconsideration by ballot referendum this year. Meanwhile,
California—a death penalty state—has two ballot measures before voters in 2016 that would either
reform or end the death penalty there. For more on each State’s activity, see Douglas Berman, Might
the Nebraska death penalty repeal referendum in 2016 be even more important symbolically than
the dueling California capital initiatives?, Sentencing Law & Policy Blog,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2016/07/might-the-nebraska-deathpenalty-repeal-referendum-in-2016-be-even-more-important-symbolically-than-.html (posted July
6, 2016).
56. See HEARING ON OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, SUBCOMM. ON THE
CONSTITUTION, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (June 25, 2007) (testimony of William G. Otis)
(“the central reason for opposing abolition of the death penalty is that it is a one-size-fits-all
proposition.”).
57. See generally Michael L. Radelet, Given That We Know We Sometimes Convict Innocent
People, What, If Anything, Does That Say About the Death Penalty?: The Role of the Innocence
Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199 (2008); JIM DWYER,
ET. AL, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions
Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996).
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sentence should be forbidden. The risk of executing innocents is simply
not the same in every capital case. In some cases, the risk is negligible,
or even non-existent. 58 Moreover, opposing imposition of the death
penalty upon an innocent person tells us very little about the proper
punishment for a guilty person. Why should the risk of executing
innocents impede the execution of, for example, an unquestionably
guilty killer like Timothy McVeigh or Dzokhar Tsarnaev? Political life
brings risks, risks that sometimes unfortunately implicate innocents. The
political community can decide whether to tolerate those risks. 59 But it
often does (for example, in war, in policing, or in defining the law of
self-defense).
Still, the argument for abolition—and particularly for judicial
abolition, which some abolitionists appear to prefer 60—survives. And
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross 61 formulated the
outlines for such a claim, doing so as passionately as any modern
judicial opinion, focusing (predictably) upon geographic biases,
arbitrariness in selection, and the risk of executing innocents. 62 Although
Justice Breyer—joined by Justice Ginsburg—did not call for the Court
to once and for all end the use of capital punishment, his opinion noted
his view that it was “highly likely” that the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment, and called for briefing and argument on the
question. 63 He then repeated his call more recently in his dissents from
the denial of certiorari in Tucker v. Louisiana 64 and Boyer v. Davis. 65 In
Tucker, he noted that the defendant had received the death penalty in
Caddo Parish, and speculated that perhaps Tucker received the death
penalty “not because of the comparative egregiousness of his crime, but
because of an arbitrary feature of his case, namely, geography.” 66 In
Boyer, he focused upon what he perceived as the Eighth Amendment
problems created by California’s system of death penalty administration,
and reiterated the three pillars of his Glossip dissent: “(1) serious
unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, and (3) unconscionably
58. See Kent Scheidegger, Exoneration Inflation, Continued, Crime & Consequences (Dec.
17,
2014),
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2014/12/exoneration-inflationcontinue.html#more.
59. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
323, 340 (2003).
61. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2776-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Tucker v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 1801 (2016).
65. Boyer v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 1446 (2016).
66. Tucker, 136 S. Ct. at 1801-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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long delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose.” 67
But Justice Scalia did not allow these claims to go unanswered. In
his own concurrence in Glossip, Scalia responded directly to Justice
Breyer’s dissent:
A vocal minority of the Court, waving over their heads a ream of the
most recent abolitionist studies (a superabundant genre) as though they
have discovered the lost folios of Shakespeare, insist that now, at long
last, the death penalty must be abolished for good. Mind you, not once
in the history of the American Republic has this Court ever suggested
that the death penalty is categorically impermissible. The reason is obvious: It is impossible to hold unconstitutional that which the Constitution explicitly contemplates.” 68

Scalia goes on to dismantle the Breyer dissent. His opinion is not
charitable, often mocking Justice Breyer’s sources and his conclusions
(he refers to one argument as “gobbledy-gook,” 69 another as
“nonsense,” 70 and describes Justice Breyer as the “Drum Major in this
parade” 71 of cases requiring conformity to the Court’s view of “evolving
standards of decency”).
As to Breyer’s unreliability claim, Scalia says it is “convictions, not
punishments, that are unreliable,” and the risk of wrongful conviction
inheres equally in a system of life imprisonment. 72 Though Scalia is
correct, and though the risk of executing an innocent need not be (as I
explain above) a reason for abandoning capital punishment, Scalia does
not spend sufficient time in this opinion taking seriously the claims of
actual innocence—claims worth taking seriously, even if not sufficient
to justify abandoning the death penalty altogether. Scalia had earlier
made clear his skepticism about the Court’s power to review actual
innocence claims in Herrera v. Collins, where he noted the Court’s
“reluctance . . . to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand
any injustice, much less the execution of an innocent man who has
received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has
traditionally deemed adequate.” 73
Moreover, although he does not cite to it in Glossip, Justice Scalia
wrote extensively about the problem of actual innocence in his
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh 74 nearly a decade earlier. Marsh
involved the validity of Kansas’s “equipoise” rule, in which the death
penalty is imposed if the mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators.75
The Court held that imposing the death penalty where the evidence was
“in equipoise” did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 76 Responding to
Justice Souter’s concerns in dissent about the risks of executing the
innocent, 77 Scalia noted that actual innocence was not at issue in this
case (the dissent’s “policy agenda” was, he said, “nailed to the door of
the wrong church” 78). In any event, the dissent failed to point to any case
in the modern death penalty era in which an actually innocent person had
been executed. 79 He also cited problems with the conclusions of various
scholarly research on actual innocence 80 and chided the dissent for using
a “distorted” concept of “exoneration,” which includes those freed from
death row on legal grounds other than actual innocence. 81 He also
explained a theme that he would reiterate in Glossip: that the special
attention given to capital cases makes it more likely errors will be caught
in capital cases than in cases that do not involve the imposition of a
death sentence. 82 But he closed with an admonition that reflected his
view of the lines separating judicial power from political power on the
subject of capital punishment. “The American people have determined
that the good to be derived from capital punishment . . . outweighs the
risk of error,” he said. 83 “It is no proper part of the business of this
Court, or of its Justices, to second guess that judgment, much less
impugn it before the world, and less still to frustrate it by imposing
judicially invented obstacles to its execution.” 84
As to Breyer’s arbitrariness claim in Glossip, Scalia reminds us
74. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 182 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). Disclosure: although
I did not play any role personally in litigating the Marsh case, when I served in the Justice
Department’s Capital Case Unit, I was among a group of lawyers who assisted the Kansas Attorney
General in preparing the case for oral argument before the Supreme Court.
75. Id. at 166-67.
76. Id. at 181.
77. Id. at 208-211 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 186 (Scalia, J. concurring).
79. Id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring). To Scalia’s opinion, one might add the notable work of
Ward Campbell on this subject. See, e.g., Ward Campbell, Exoneration Inflation: Justice Scalia’s
Concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh, IACJ J. 48 (Summer 2008).
82. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. Id. For an examination of Scalia’s opinions in this area, see Lee Kovarsky, Justice
Scalia’s Innocence Tetralogy, 101 MINN. L. REV. 94 (2016) (discussing Scalia’s views of actual
innocence claims in death penalty cases).
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some variation is inevitable in the jurors’ approaches to questions about
how to apply their moral judgments. 85 And as to Breyer’s claim of
inordinate delays, Scalia quite rightly noted that much delay in the
system is a product of the extensive process to which capital defendants
are entitled. 86 Comparatively few delays, then, are solely the product of
state action. In a system devoted to ensuring the maximum possible
procedural protection for a capital defendant—and one that includes a
variety of post-conviction process, opportunity for clemency, as well as
direct appeals—some delay in carrying out executions is inevitable.87
But such delays are not the same everywhere. 88 Moreover, Justice
Breyer fails to explain why the remedy for such delays would be the
abandonment of capital punishment. Why would the remedy not be a
process in which the state (and judges) must more expeditiously consider
petitions from death row inmates? In other words, why is the remedy for
inordinate delays the abandonment of capital punishment, rather than to
adopt procedures that make that punishment effective? 89
Scalia then completed his refutation of Justice Breyer—and of the
argument against the death penalty’s constitutionality—with an appeal to
constitutional lines. “Capital punishment presents moral questions that
philosophers, theologians, and statesmen have grappled with for
millennia. The Framers of our Constitution disagreed bitterly on the
matter,” he wrote. 90 “For that reason, they handled it the same way they
handled many other controversial issues: they left it to the People to
decide.” 91
C. On Categorical Exemptions from Capital Punishment
Scalia also aggressively objected to what has become one of the
most formidable constitutional bases for judicially narrowing American

85. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. See J. Richard Broughton, Jones, Lackey, and Teague, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 961,
983-84 (2015).
88. I am reminded, as I noted in my aforementioned article on Lackey claims, see id. at 965
n. 17, of a recent brief submitted by Texas in response to a claim by a Texas death row inmate that
the Court should grant relief for an inordinate delay in his execution, basing his claim in part on a
federal district court holding from California. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (C.D. Cal.
2014), rev’d. sub. nom. Jones v. Davis, 808 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015)). The State responded: “Texas
is not California.” Respondent’s Brief in Opp., Bower v. Texas, No. 14-292, at 35 (U.S., filed Nov.
13, 2014).
89. See Broughton, Jones, Lackey, and Teague, supra note 87, at 987.
90. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2749-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 2

216

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:203

death penalty practices: the categorical exemption, based either on the
particular physical characteristics of the defendant that reduce his
culpability or on the nature of the defendant’s crime.
In Coker v. Georgia (and prior to Justice Scalia’s appointment to
the Court), a Court plurality held that the Eighth Amendment forbid the
imposition of capital punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman, where no death resulted. 92 Coker was based on a two-pronged
approach that purports to look first at the objective indicia of societal
attitudes about a particular capital punishment practice, but then requires
the Court to conduct an independent analysis of the death penalty
practice at issue. 93 As applied, however, the objective prong has never
done the work that the Court supposes. Rather, the Court’s cases have
actually treated the objective indicia as subordinate to the Court’s
independent judgment about the acceptability of the practice.94 Indeed, it
would be difficult to find a constitutional framework less connected to
the constitutional text and history, and more closely tied to the value
preferences of the judge, than the existing categorical exemption
framework. By departing from a pure national consensus approach and
conceding that the objective factors of societal attitudes are merely
advisory, the Court charted its inevitable path toward a framework that
places greater emphasis on values identified by the Court than by the
American people and their elected representatives, who still approve of
the death penalty in substantial numbers. 95
Applying that framework, the Court, during Scalia’s tenure, forbid
capital punishment for the mentally disabled 96, for those who commit
capital murder before reaching age eighteen97, and for those who commit
any crime against the person—no matter how heinous, depraved, or
harmful—that does not result in death. 98 In doing so, the Court also
found itself guided by scientific propositions and international opinion
and practice, factors that Scalia found particularly objectionable. 99
92. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
93. Id. at 597.
94. See J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital Punishment, 58 FLA. L. REV.
639, 647 (2006).
95. See Broughton, Hate Crimes, supra note 51, at 203-05. But cf. Linda E. Carter, The
Evolution of Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Death
Penalty Cases, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 229, 245 (2013) (defending the second prong of the capital
proportionality test as consistent with constitutional structure).
96. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
97. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
98. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
99. See, e.g., Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 at 623-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the basic premise of
the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—
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Ever the critic of judicially divining “evolving standards of
decency,” 100 and consistent with his effort to keep the lines of judicial
power bright, Scalia believed instead that these questions could be
resolved solely on objective factors.101 In Stanford v. Kentucky, 102 Scalia
wrote for the Court that the Eighth Amendment did not forbid a capital
sentence for a person who had not attained the age of eighteen, so long
as there was no national consensus against the practice. His Stanford
opinion therefore represented a sharp break from the Court’s post-Coker
precedents on categorical exemptions from the death penalty, and it
remains an outlier after Atkins, Simmons, and Kennedy. Whereas the
approach of Coker and its progeny never resolved the matter on
objective factors alone, but instead invoked the Court’s now-superior
subjective analysis, the Stanford opinion relied on the fact that a
minority of jurisdictions rejected the death penalty for offenders under
age seventeen, and an even smaller minority rejected it for offenders
under age eighteen. 103 This evidence was sufficient to conclude that
there was no national consensus against the use of capital punishment
for a murder committed at age sixteen or seventeen.104 The view of what
constituted a national consensus changed dramatically by the time the
Court overruled Stanford in Simmons, which—along with Atkins—
looked simply to the “consistency of the direction of change.” 105 More
critically, however, Stanford proved to be an outlier in rejecting a
subjective Eighth Amendment analysis, a result made especially notable
in light of Justice White’s decision to join the Scalia opinion in full
(Justice White wrote the plurality opinion that invoked the two pronged,
objective-then-subjective framework in Coker).
Scalia’s rejection of an “independent” subjective analysis—and his
obvious effort to validate the lines that he thought divided judicial from
political power as to the acceptability of capital punishment—was even
clearer in the portion of Stanford for which Justice Scalia spoke for
himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices White and Kennedy (and which
Justice O’Connor refused to join). There, Scalia referred to the
“socioscientific” evidence demonstrating the reduced culpability of
ought to be rejected out of hand.”).
100. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
101. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that it “will rarely if ever be the case that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the
evolution in views of the American people than do their elected representatives.”).
102. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
103. Id. at 370-72.
104. Id. at 373.
105. Atkins, 492 U.S. at 315.
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juveniles, evidence the Court would later validate in Simmons. 106 But, he
said, on the battlefield of the Eighth Amendment, “socioscientific,
ethicoscientific, and even purely scientific evidence is not an available
weapon. 107 The punishment “is either ‘cruel and unusual’ (i.e., society
has set its face against it) or it is not. The audience for these arguments,
in other words, is not this Court but the citizenry of the United States. It
is they, not we, who must be persuaded.” 108 The Constitution, he wrote,
does not empower the Justices to “substitute our belief in the scientific
evidence for the society’s apparent skepticism.” 109
Scalia therefore wrote robust dissents in Atkins and Simmons. As
for the objective indicia of a national consensus in Atkins, Scalia
correctly noted that as of 2002, less than half of death penalty
jurisdictions had imposed a legislative ban on the death penalty for the
mentally disabled, and only seven of those states imposed the death
penalty for all persons who were mentally disabled. 110 The remaining
states did not have retroactive legislation, meaning that they permitted
the execution of any inmate who was already on death row, even if
mentally disabled under state law.111 Moreover, Scalia correctly
explained that any rarity in death sentences for the mentally disabled is
likely a product of the Court’s decision in 1989 to require juries to
consider evidence of mental disability as a mitigating factor in capital
sentencing. 112 In Simmons, the objective evidence was equally weak. As
Scalia noted, only eighteen death penalty states had enacted legislation
to exempt those under age eighteen, and only four had done so since
Stanford. 113 And, as with mental disability, the Court required the states
to permit juror consideration of youth as a mitigating factor. 114
It was rare, then, that Scalia would side with the claims of a capital
defendant challenging a death penalty statute or procedure. In one of his
last cases on the Court, however, Scalia did just that. In Hurst v. Florida,
the Court invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, which
allowed a judge to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and to treat
the jury’s recommendation as merely advisory. 115 The Court, in an
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Atkins, 492 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
Simmons, 545 U.S. at 609-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)).
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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opinion by Justice Sotomayor, held that this violated the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial 116 and was inconsistent with the
holding in Ring v. Arizona, which had held unconstitutional a death
penalty scheme in which the judge and not the jury found the facts that
would render a defendant death-eligible. 117 Justice Scalia joined the
Sotomayor opinion, just as he joined the majority in Ring. But his
conclusions in both of these cases must be understood in light of the
“quandary” he described in his Ring concurrence: he disagreed with the
Court’s post-Furman imposition of aggravators upon the states, but also
believed that the jury trial guarantee was “in perilous decline” and that
the Arizona scheme clearly implicated that guarantee. 118 He therefore
conceded that he had gained new wisdom on the matter since approving
the Arizona scheme twelve years earlier, 119 and decided that even if the
states had been unduly coerced into requiring certain aggravators as a
matter of constitutional mandate, those factors must be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 120
It cannot be said fairly, then, that Justice Scalia saw no limitations
on the state’s use of capital punishment. 121 Still, emboldened by his
reliance on the text of the Fifth Amendment, by what he viewed as the
structural limits on the Court’s power to stand in the way of imposing
the death penalty, and, perhaps, even by the personal convictions that led
him to conclude that the death penalty was not immoral, Scalia
overwhelmingly rejected constitutional challenges to the use of capital
punishment. His sense of constitutional line-drawing led him to conclude
that the people, acting politically, should decide whether and how to
impose capital punishment. But, of course, Scalia’s colleagues did not
always draw those same lines. After his death, then, the fate of Scalia’s
lines is in question, even in doubt.
III. DEATH PENALTY LINES ON A POST-SCALIA COURT
With Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016, the political battle
over the Court and constitutional law has reached a fever pitch. The
open seat on the Court could determine the future of the death penalty in
116. Id. at 619.
117. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
118. See id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-57 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Cf. Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging
Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 603 (1995); Steven G. Gey, Justice
Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 102 (1992).
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America. Though political and legal commentary about the 2016
elections focused on a number of important issues, including the future
of the Court in light of Scalia’s death, 122 it largely ignored the
consequences for capital punishment. But the lines that Scalia sought to
draw between legitimate judicial authority to enforce the Bill of Rights
and the legitimate power of the state to continue imposing the death
penalty for heinous crimes are now in greater jeopardy than at any time
since the early 1970s. The categorical exemption cases 123 have
legitimized the Court’s power to impose substantive limits on the death
penalty, making it easier to justify the progression from procedural
supervision—from Furman 124 to the 1976 125 cases to Lockett v. Ohio 126
and Eddings v. Oklahoma 127—to outright substantive abolition.
Moreover, the claim for legitimating judicial abolitionism is not
presented covertly, in some legal sneak attack. It does not have to be,
because opposition to capital punishment today is neither shockingly
rare nor does it exist simply on the political fringes. The judicial
challenge to the death penalty’s validity is yet another wolf coming as a
wolf.
On the current Court, Justice Breyer appears to have staked out this
position. Although he has not explicitly argued that the Court should
rule the death penalty cruel and unusual in all circumstances, his Glossip
dissent and his recent dissents from the denial of certiorari in Boyer and
Tucker have plainly signaled that he favors considering the question,
and—it is fair to conclude—would be likely to so hold on the merits.
One might reasonably add Justice Ginsburg’s vote to that of Justice
Breyer, as she has joined him in multiple cases on this matter. 128 At that
122. See, e.g., Lydia Wheeler, Election to Shape Supreme Court, THE HILL (July 17, 2016),
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/287828-election-to-shape-supreme-court; Albert R. Hunt,
The Supreme Court Really Matters in This Election, Bloomberg, (July 3, 2016)
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-03/the-supreme-court-really-matters-in-thiselection.
123. See supra note 122.
124. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that death penalty is
unconstitutional where it is the product of unguided sentencing discretion).
125. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
126. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that capital jurors must have the
opportunity to consider mitigating evidence related to the crime and to the defendant’s character and
background).
127. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that capital jurors cannot be
precluded from considering mitigation evidence).
128. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Tucker v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 1801 (2016) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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point, the dominoes start to fall. Although neither Justice Kagan nor
Justice Sotomayor has expressed the same view as Justice Breyer—and,
interestingly, neither has joined in his more aggressive opinions on the
possibility of judicial abolition—one might expect that those two
justices would be persuaded to join their more liberal colleagues on this
issue. If this voting lineup emerges as accurate, this means that only one
additional vote would be necessary to judicially abolish the death
penalty. Casting a vote to permanently abolish the death penalty would
be a stunning move for a rookie justice and this seems far less likely
under President Trump than may have been true had Hillary Clinton
prevailed in the election. Still, the possibility of judicial abolition
remains alive, and the confirmation process for Justice Scalia’s
successor should give considerable attention to this issue.
If, as seems likely, President Trump fills Justice Scalia’s seat with
an appointee who is uneasy about, or outright opposed to, judicial
abolition, then we must consider the next alternative: Justice Kennedy.
And if Justice Kennedy is willing to vote with the four other Justices
who are likely to support judicial abolition, then whether Justice Scalia’s
seat is vacant would not matter to the Court’s voting.
Others have pondered whether Justice Kennedy can be persuaded
on this issue. 129 The main arguments for this proposition are not
inconsiderable ones. First, Justice Kennedy has been among the leaders
on the Court in limiting the scope of the death penalty through the
granting of categorical exemptions under the Eighth Amendment. 130 He
wrote the Court’s opinions in Simmons and Kennedy, as well as the
opinion in Hall v. Florida that clarified the scope of the categorical
exemption for mental disability granted in Atkins, 131 and the opinion in
Panetti v. Quarterman 132 that clarified the procedures and standards that
apply when a condemned prisoner makes a threshold showing that he is

129. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Fates Worse Than Death?, SLATE (July 14, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/07/will_kennedy_overturn_the
_death_penalty_his_views_on_solitary_confinement.html; Matt Ford, How a Victory for the Death
Penalty May Hasten Its End, THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/07/death-penalty-kennedy/399419/; David Cole, Justice Breyer V. The Death
Penalty, THE NEW YORKER (June 30, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/justicebreyer-against-the-death-penalty. I would note that this was also a subject of some conversation at
the aforementioned Michigan Journal of Law Reform symposium. See generally Jason Searle,
Speakers address future of death penalty, DETROIT LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://legalnews.com/detroit/1420611/.
130. See Carter, supra note 95, at 239-46.
131. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
132. Panetti v. Quaterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 2

222

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:203

insane and thus exempt from execution. 133 In Simmons, he plainly
signaled concerns about the American view of capital punishment when
compared with America’s peers internationally. 134 While he limited his
references there to international opinion on “the juvenile death penalty,”
there is ample reason to believe that he could be similarly influenced by
the weight of international opinion—particularly in advanced nations—
against the death penalty generally. And if public sentiment about
American capital punishment—though still favorable to it now—were to
decline measurably, it is also reasonable to think that he might be moved
to further apply his observation in Hall that “the Eighth Amendment ‘is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by human justice.’” 135
A second argument with which one must contend is that Justice
Kennedy has been among the most vocal champions on the modern
Court of a jurisprudence of human dignity. 136 Justice Kennedy has
recently been outspoken on the practice of solitary confinement and
whether it can be legally sustained. 137 While Justice Kennedy’s opinions
in cases like Simmons, Kennedy, and Hall refer to the relationship
between the Eighth Amendment and preservation of human dignity, 138
133. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
134. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
135. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
136. For a general discussion of the subject, see Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011). For extensive treatment of dignity and the reach of criminal
law and sentencing, see Michael Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 291 (2013);
Eva S. Nilson, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007). As to constitutional law more
broadly, see Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence,
84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006). For discussion of how Catholic teaching informs a death penalty
jurisprudence tied to human dignity, see Kurt M. Denk, S.J., Jurisprudence That Necessarily
Embodies Moral Judgment: The Eighth Amendment, Catholic Teaching, and Death Penalty
Discourse, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 323 (2012). And for a note of caution in using human dignity
too liberally, see Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 201 (2008).
137. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 U.S. 2187 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“the judiciary may
be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether workable alternative
systems for long-term confinement exist, and if so, whether a correctional system should be
required to adopt them.”).
138. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 560 (“the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons”); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“Evolving standards
of decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of
criminals must conform to the rule.”); Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992 (stating that imposition of the
“harshest of punishments” upon the mentally disabled “violates his or her inherent dignity as a
human being”). This notion was also found in the original “evolving standards” case, Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), which referred to the “underlying concept” of the Eighth Amendment as
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other obvious examples are those cases involving rights that extend to
same-sex couples, a subject on which Justice Kennedy has been a
leading voice (perhaps the leading voice on the Court). Justice Kennedy
wrote the landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 139 recognizing both
due process and equal protection rights to same-sex marriage. The
opinion is littered with references to human dignity. 140 The same holds
true for Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United States v.
Windsor, 141 the pre-Obergefell decision holding that the federal
definition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act violated equal
protection. There, too, Justice Kennedy wrote of “the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages.” 142 He wrote Lawrence v. Texas, striking down a
Texas law that made it a crime to engage in sodomy with a person of the
same sex, explaining that people of the same sex should be able to
maintain a sexual relationship in private “and still retain their dignity as
free persons.” 143 Additionally, he wrote Romer v. Evans, striking down,
on equal protection grounds, a Colorado law that forbid local
governments from giving legal protections based on sexual orientation in
their civil rights laws.144 Finally, others have noted that Justice Kennedy
has expressed concern about the length of stays on death row in some
jurisdictions, and whether such lengthy stays would frustrate the
purposes of capital punishment. 145
In light of this record, Justice Kennedy’s vote certainly seems
obtainable by abolitionists. But caution is in order. Yes, Justice Kennedy
wrote the categorical exemption cases, but those decisions were based
on the finding that individual instances of the death penalty’s imposition
would be constitutionally disproportionate either for a given crime or a
given offender. 146 This is far different, however, from concluding—as
“nothing less than the dignity of man.” Id. at 100-01. See also Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy,
Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: “Still in Search of a Unifying Principle”?, 73 U. PITT. L.
REV. 107, 160 (2011) (noting that “thread of respect for human dignity” as unifying the Court’s
cases under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
139. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
140. See, e.g., id. at 2599 (“There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who
seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices”).
141. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
142. Id. at 2693.
143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
144. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
145. See Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the
Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 990-91 (2014) (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s
remarks during the argument of Hall v. Florida, in which he questioned the State’s attorney on
whether a lengthy delay on death row was consistent with the purposes of the death penalty and
orderly administration of justice).
146. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
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one must to hold the death penalty per se unconstitutional—that each
and every instance, or even an overwhelming majority of instances, of
the death penalty’s imposition would violate principles of
proportionality. It is one thing to say that the death penalty is
disproportionate for a seventeen-year-old, or for a person who does not
kill. It is quite another to say—again, as one must, if one believes that
proportionality is a constitutional basis for invalidating the death penalty
in all circumstances—that the death penalty is categorically
disproportionate for a Timothy McVeigh or the Carr brothers. 147
Moreover, public opinion remains quite favorable to capital punishment
(and likely understates support for it in certain cases). 148 Continued
public support for the death penalty, combined with Justice Kennedy’s
sensibilities with respect to federalism and deference to the states in
administering their own criminal law, 149 could therefore undermine the
argument about his willingness to favor complete judicial abolition.
Moreover, it is true that Justice Kennedy has spoken openly and
movingly about human dignity in his judicial writings. And that theme
has certainly played a central role in arguments about the invalidity of
capital punishment—both in the 1970s and today. 150 Justice Breyer’s
work in this area has repeated that theme, notably in his Glossip
dissent. 151 But it is also noteworthy that Justice Kennedy has not joined
in any of Justice Breyer’s opinions questioning the constitutionality of
the death penalty. He also joined the lead opinions in each of the cases
involving challenges to execution procedures, Glossip and Baze v.
Rees. 152 And with respect to the notion that Justice Kennedy might be
interested in a claim involving an excessive delay in carrying out an
execution, there is reason to be skeptical of this argument. The Court has
repeatedly rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment bars
imposition of the death penalty after a lengthy delay (so-called “Lackey
claims”), 153 and although Justice Breyer (and previously, Justice
Stevens) has shown interest in reviewing such claims, 154 Justice
(2005).
147. See Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 638-40 (2016).
148. See Broughton, Hate Crimes, supra note 51.
149. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-93 (1991) (“Our federal system recognizes the
independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a
State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.”).
150. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 138, at 160.
151. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the “dehumanizing”
effect of solitary confinement while awaiting execution).
152. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
153. See Broughton, Jones, Lackey, and Teague, supra note 87, at 964-65.
154. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
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Kennedy has not. Despite his question during the Hall argument, Justice
Kennedy has not returned to the subject and has not joined any of the
dissents from the denial of certiorari that questioned whether this might
pose an Eighth Amendment problem.
Still, the October 2015 Term offered abolitionists reasons for
renewed (or continued) optimism about eventually obtaining Justice
Kennedy’s vote. Justice Kennedy, for example, had regularly voted to
strike down affirmative action policies in higher education. He even
wrote the opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin155 when it
first arrived at the Court in 2013, and scolded the Fifth Circuit for an
approach that was too deferential for strict scrutiny review. It therefore
seemed sensible to predict that Justice Kennedy would be among those
voting to invalidate the Texas policy when it returned to the Court in
2015. But Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in Fisher II upholding the
program and affirming the Fifth Circuit’s revised decision. 156 In
addition, although Justice Kennedy was among the three Justices who
authored the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 157
reaffirming the “central holding” of Roe v. Wade, he has also been a
consistent vote in upholding a variety of abortion restrictions. 158 But in
June 2016, Justice Kennedy joined the more Liberal wing of the Court in
invalidating two abortion restrictions embedded in a more
comprehensive Texas law regulating abortion. 159 Of course, these cases
may not tell us much about Justice Kennedy’s current thinking on the
question of invalidating the death penalty in all circumstances. But they
are a potentially ominous sign for those advocates of the death penalty—
or at least of judicial restraint in this area—who otherwise have placed
their confidence in Justice Kennedy’s reluctance to join with the idea of
abolitionism in prior cases. Past is not necessarily prologue in Justice
Kennedy’s jurisprudence.
So while Justice Kennedy seems like the one Justice on the current
Court who could move it toward judicial abolition of the death penalty,
certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1114-21 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari & Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
155. Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
156. Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
157. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
158. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (opinion by Kennedy, J.); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,
480 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (joining opinion of the Court). And, of course,
he voted to uphold nearly all of the abortion restrictions at issue in Casey.
159. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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there are reasons to think that he is not willing to go quite so far.
Although he has certainly not shown the kind of solicitude for deference
to political bodies that was a central part of Justice Scalia’s approach,
Justice Kennedy has thus far shown no interest in removing capital
punishment entirely from the state’s criminal law toolbox. At least in
this narrow sense, Justice Kennedy could help to preserve the formal
lines between political and judicial action on the death penalty that
Justice Scalia fought so hard to safeguard. Still, he and Justice Scalia
were often on different sides in death penalty cases. And if the October
2015 Term is any indication, there are reasons for advocates of restraint
in this field to be at least concerned about Justice Kennedy’s approach to
the line dividing judicial abolition from political action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, it is not fashionable to defend the death penalty—politically
or legally. That is especially true in academic and political settings, even
(gasp!) conservative ones. But Antonin Scalia cared little about doing or
saying what was fashionable, faddish, popular, or politically correct.
This was, after all, a man who sought out the traditional Latin Mass, and
challenged the “new” position of the Catholic Church on capital
punishment as inconsistent with established Christian teaching on
retribution. Of course, this is not to say that Scalia did not understand or
appreciate contemporary life. It is to say, rather, that he viewed changing
the law to suit the fashions, and passions, of the day as someone else’s
job, but not the judge’s. Whatever their personal views on the death
penalty, Scalia believed, judges must respect the constitutional lines that
restrain them from imposing their will upon the Nation, absent some
explicit command of the constitutional text that would empower the
judge to invalidate a death sentence or capital punishment practice.
Today, though, under the ill-conceived guise of giving some meaning to
modernity’s “evolving standards of decency,” the Court is poised to
obliterate those formal lines that Scalia believed to be so critical to the
Court’s institutional legitimacy and to American constitutional
government. Long live formalism, indeed.
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